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Abstract
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market
(the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the
other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences dened over
institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences
for stability when the composition of ones coworkers or colleagues can a¤ect
the preferences over institutions. Journal of Economic Literature Classication
Number: J41.
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1. Introduction
A large class of two-sided matching models describe situations in which agents on
one side of the market, say rms or colleges or more generally institutions, are each
matchedto agents, say workers or students or individuals, on the other side of
the market.1 A common assumption in thesemany-to-one matching models is that
individuals have preferences dened only over the institutions to which they can
be matched, although the special problems posed by couples was recognized. As
Roth and Sotomayor [6, page 171] remarked, we continue to make the simplifying
assumption that workers are indi¤erent to which other workers are employed by
the same rm.
A moments reection is enough to convince us that there are many instances
where this simplifying assumptionis unlikely to hold good. For instance, univer-
sity professors care about the composition of the rest of the faculty, while soccer
players would prefer to join a team of Peles and Maradonas. Clearly, the compo-
sition of ones coworkers or colleagues can a¤ect the preferences over institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate workerspreferences over matchings
which depend on the composition of colleagues into the traditional theory of two-
sided matching models. In particular, we analyse the consequences of imposing
plausible restrictions on individualspreferences over (institution-colleagues) pairs.
We essentially assume that workerspreferences are lexicographic. Within this
broad category, one possibility is to assume that although workers care about who
their coworkers are, it is their preferences over rms which dictate their overall
preferences over rm-colleague pairs. We show that when workers preferences are
of this type, then the set of matchings in the core2 is nonempty.
We then go on to examine whether the set of matchings in the core remains
nonempty when workerspreferences over colleagues dictate their overall prefer-
ences. Within this class of worker-lexicographicpreferences, we impose further
restrictions. We rst consider the case when a subset of the individuals are cou-
ples. We assume that each couple prefers a matching in which they are matched
together with an institution rather than a matching in which they are paired
with di¤erent institutions, irrespective of the quality of the institution. We
1Crawford and Knoer [1], Kelso and Crawford [3], Roth [4, 5] are a small sample of this
literature. See Roth and Sotomayor [6] for an illuminating and comprehensive survey of this
literature as well as an exhaustive bibliography.
2Throughout this paper, we assume that rms preferences over sets of workers satisfy a
condition called substitutability. This condition is assumed even in the traditional model, where
it turns out to be su¢ cient for a nonempty core.
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show that despite the presence of couples, the set of stable matchings remains
nonempty when preferences satisfy a condition similar to substitutability.
We then go on to assume that all workers share a common opinion about
the relative desirability of all workers. In other words, there is a unanimous
ranking of all workers, and any worker prefers to join a set of workers containing
higher-ranked workers. An alternative assumption is that workerspreferences are
separable. So, each worker divides his or her set of potential colleagues into the
set of good and bad workers. Adding a good worker leads to a better set, while
adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.
However, it turns out that in both the latter cases of worker-lexicographic
preferences, one can construct preference proles which result in the core being
empty. Hence, this paper shows that one of the major results of the standard
model - namely, the existence of matchings which are immune to blocking by a
coalition of rms and agents - is not particularly robust.
2. Notation and Denitions
The agents in our market consist of a set F of n rms, and a set W of p workers.
Generic elements of W will be denoted by wi;mi; w; i; j, etc., while those of F
will be denoted by Fi; Fj; F , etc. In general, F represents the set of institutions
(rms, universities, research establishments), while W is the set of individuals
(workers, university professors, researchers). We will typically use the terms rms
and workers to represent institutions and individuals.
Firms hire sets of workers, and each Fj 2 F has a strict preference ordering
P (Fj) over 2W [fFjg, where 2W is the set of all nonempty subsets ofW. For any
wi 2 W, letWi = fS j S  W ; wi 2 Sg. Each worker wi has a preference ordering
R(wi) dened over (FWi) [fwig with asymmetric component P (wi). Note that
this formulation allows a worker to care about the rm that she is matched with,
as well as with her coworkers.
A matching will be a particular assignment of workers to rms keeping the
bilateral nature of their relationship, as well as the possibility of any particular
agent(s) being unable to nd partners. The formal denition is given below.
Denition 1: Amatching  is a mapping from F[W into the set of all nonempty
subsets of F [W such that for all w 2 W and F 2 F :
(i) j(w)j = 1 and (w) = w if (w) =2 F ;
(ii) (F )  W [ fFg, and (F ) = F if (F ) =2 2W ;
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(iii) (w) = F i¤ w 2 (F ).
Given any matching , and any worker w matched at , let F = (w) and
S = (F ). Then, we will represent S as 2(w). That is, 2(w) is the set consisting
of worker w and her colleagues in the rm with which she is matched.
Let F 2 F . Then, the preference ordering P (F ) of rm F over 2W [ fFg
induces an ordering over the set of matchings. Thus, rm F prefers  to 
if (F )P (F )(F ). Similarly, the preference ordering P (w) of a worker w in-
duces an ordering over the set of matchings. So, worker w prefers  to  if
((w); 2(w))P (w)((w); 2(w)).3 With some abuse of notation, we will also let
P (F ) and P (w) denote the induced orderings of F and w over the set of matchings.
Denition 2: A matching  is individually rational if for all F 2 F and w 2 W,
not fFgP (F )(F ) and ((w); 2(w))R(w)fwg.
So, a matching is individually rational if no worker or rm prefers to be un-
matched. Notice that in a framework where workers have preferences over poten-
tial colleagues, this denition corresponds to the usual interpretation of individual
rationality as a constraint which expresses what an individual agent can achieve
unilaterally. In contrast, a matching  in the traditional model is dened to be
individually rational only if no rm F prefers any subset of (F ) to (F ). Roth
and Sotomayor [6] remark that this recognises that F may re some workers in
(F ) if it chooses, without a¤ecting other members (italics ours) of (F ). Ob-
viously, when workers have preferences over potential colleagues, if a subset of
(F ) is red, then some of the remaining workers may well quit. This makes our
denition of individual rationality more appropriate in the present framework.
Denition 3: Given any prole of preferences P=(fR(w)gw2W ,fP (F )gF2F), a
matching  is in the core, denoted C(P), if there is no A  F[W and a matching
0 such that:
(i) 0(w) 2 A 8 w 2 A;
(ii) 0(F )  A 8 F 2 A;
(iii) 0P (F ) 8 F 2 A;
(iv) 0P (w) 8 w 2 A.
Remark 1: If such an A and 0 exist, then we will say that  is blocked by A.
3If the worker w is unmatched according to either  or , then appropriate changes need to
be made.
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Also, note that if a matching is not individually rational, then it is obviously not
in the core.
So, a matching  is in the core if no group of rms and workers can obtain a
more preferred matching entirely on their own.
Remark 2: An alternate version of the core, denoted by CW (P), is the set of
matchings which cannot be weakly blockedby any group of rms and workers,
where  is weakly blocked by A via 0 if all members of A nd 0 at least as good
as  and at least one member of A strictly prefers 0 to .
Remark 3: In the denition of the core given above, a matching may not be
in the core because it is blocked by a group of rms and some set of workers.
However, it is easy to show that if a matching is not in the core, then either it is
not individually rational or it is blocked by a single rm and some workers.
3. Preference Restrictions
This section contains a description of various alternative restrictions that will
be imposed on workers preferences. However, we rst dene a restriction of
substitutability which will be imposed on rms preferences. It is known that
when rmspreferences are substitutable, the core is nonempty in the standard or
traditional model when workers are indi¤erent about their coworkers. Since our
purpose is to examine the consequences of permitting workers to care about their
coworkers, we will assume that rmspreferences are substitutable.
Given any set S  W, let ChF (S) denote rm F 0s most-preferred subset of S
according to its preference ordering P (F ). Since F is not a subset of S  W, we
are identifying the empty set with F itself in its preference ordering.
Denition 4: P (F ) has the property of substitutability if for any set S containing
workers w;w0 2 W (w 6= w0), w 2 ChF (S) implies w 2 ChF (Snfw0g).
So, if F has substitutable preferences, then it regards workers in ChF (S) as
substitutes rather than complements since it continues to want to employ worker
w even if some of the other workers become unavailable.
Let PT denote the set of all logically possible preference proles where rms
preferences are substitutable and workers preferences correspond to the tradi-
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tional model.4
We rst consider markets in which a subset of individuals consists of couples.
Let W = Wc [ Q, where Wc is the set of workers who are couples, and Q is the
set of single workers. We will sometimes nd it convenient to represent a typical
couple (m;w) as c, and C as the set of couples.
We will assume that any member of a couple always prefers to be matched
together with his or her partner, rather than be matched alone. So, consider
any c = (m;w). Then, let Wfcg = Wm \ Ww, that is Wfcg is the subsets of W
containing both m and w.
Denition 5: Let i be any member of some couple c = (i; j) 2 C. Then, is
preference ordering, P (i) satises Togetherness if:
(i) for all pairs (F; S); (F 0; S 0) 2 FWi, (F; S)P (i)(F 0; S 0) whenever S 2 Wfcg
and S 0 =2 Wfcg;
(ii) for all F 2 F and S; S 0 2 Wfcg, i is indi¤erent between (F; S) and (F; S 0);
(iii) for all F 2 F and S 2 Wi such that j =2 S, i is indi¤erent between (F; fig)
and (F; S);
(iv) for all distinct F; F 0 2 F and S; S 0 2 Wi, either (F; S)P (i)(F 0; S 0) or
(F 0; S 0)P (i)(F; S).
We will assume a stronger form of substitutability, which we call group sub-
stitutability guaranteeing that there are no complementarities among groups of
workers. Denote byW the family of sets of the form S = fS1; :::; SKg =
S
k2K Sk,
where for each k 2 K = f1; :::; Kg ; the set Sk is either an element of Wc, Q, or
C. Obviously, every element of W can show up at most once in the set S. Con-
sider rm F with preferences P (F ) over all subsets of W , and consider any set
S = fS1; :::; SKg. Let ChF (S) =

T 2 S [ F j TP (F )Sk2M Sk for all M  K	
denote rm Fs most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering
P (F ).
Denition 6: P (F ) has the property of group substitutability if for all S =
fS1; :::; SKg =
S
k2K Sk 2 W , every pair Sk; Sk0 2 S; Sk 6= Sk0, Sk 2 ChF (S) )
Sk 2 ChF (SnSk0) :
Let PcT denote the set of preference proles where preferences of individuals in
Wc satisfy togetherness, preferences of institutions satisfy group substitutability,
4That is, workers are indi¤erent about who their coworkers are, but have a strict preference
ordering over F .
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while those of single individuals conform to those of PT .
Note that we have modelled preferences of couples in a di¤erent way from that
of Roth and Sotomayor [6], who assume that a couple have a single preference
ordering over pairs of rms. This corresponds to situations where couples do
not mind being matched to rms which are geographically close to each other.
Our formulation implicitly assumes that the option of being matched to rms
su¢ ciently close to each other is not present.
Apart from the markets with couples, we are going to assume that each worker
wis preferences over F Wi are lexicographic. Obviously, when workersprefer-
ences are lexicographic, their preferences for either rms or coworkers could dom-
inate their overall preference ordering. Thus, we have two kinds of lexicographic
preferences. These are dened below.
Denition 7: Worker wis preferences are F-lexicographic if there is a
strict ordering Pi over F such that for all (F; S); (F 0; S 0) 2 F  W i; (F 6=
F 0); (F; S)P (wi)(F 0; S 0), FPiF 0, and (F; S)P (wi)wi , FP (wi)wi.
Denition 8: Worker wis preferences are W-lexicographic if there is a
strict ordering Pi over Wi such that for all (F; S); (F 0; S 0) 2 F  W i; (S 6=
S 0); (F; S)P (wi)(F 0; S 0), SP iS 0.
Thus, if wis preferences are F-lexicographic, then wis ranking of rms, Pi,
determines wipreference ordering over all (rm, coworkers) pairs in which rms
are distinct. W-lexicographic preferences have an analogous interpretation. We
denote by PF the set of all logically possible preference proles where workers
preferences are F-lexicographic and rmspreferences are substitutable.
We impose additional restrictions when workers preferences are W-
lexicographic. When preferences are W-lexicographic, it is su¢ cient to describe
restrictions which operate on workersrankings over sets of coworkers. Consider,
for instance, the market for economists. Suppose all economists have a unanimous
ranking of economists according to their desirability. Since there are obvious ex-
ternalities generated by faculty members, most economists would prefer to join a
faculty consisting of higher ranked economists. This provides the motivation for
the next denition.
Denition 9: Workers preference orderings satisfy unanimous ranking ac-
cording to desirability (URD) if 8 wi 2 W; 8 S; T 2 W i such that S =
(T [ fwjg)nfwkg; wj =2 T; and wk 2 T , we have that S PiT i¤ j < k.
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Thus, all workers agree that wj is a better worker than wj+1 and their
preferences over coworkers respond to this ranking.
Remark 4: Note that we are not going to assume that a rms preference ordering
over sets of workers is consistent with this unanimous ranking of workers. Suppose,
for instance, that a higher-ranked worker commands a higher salary than a lower-
ranked worker. If the salary di¤erential is large enough, then the net benet
generated by the higher-ranked worker may well be lower.
Let PURD be the set of all preference proles such that workerspreference
orderings are W-lexicographic and which satisfy URD, while rmspreferences
are substitutable.
An alternative restriction will be one of separability. That is, each wi 2 W
divides Wnfwig into the set of good and bad workers. Moreover, adding a good
worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.
Denition 10: A worker wis preference ordering satises separability if there is
a partition fGi; Big of Wnfwig such that for all S 2 W i and wj =2 S,
(S [ fwjg) Pi S i¤ wj 2 Gi:
Remark 5: Note that workers do not necessarily agree on which workers are good
and bad.
Let PS be the set of all proles such that workerspreferences satisfy separa-
bility, while rms preferences are substitutable.
4. The Results
In this section, we explore the consequences of the various restrictions on prefer-
ences introduced in the previous section.
First, we show that the set of matchings in the core of the market with couples
is nonempty when preferences proles are in PcT .5 In order to prove this result, we
need to modify the deferred-acceptance algorithm, which was originally dened
by Gale and Shapley [2].
5Roth and Sotomayor [6] show that under their formulation of preferences of couples, the set
of matchings in the core may be empty.
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We describe the version of the algorithm in which individuals make o¤ers to
rms. At any step of the algorithm, an individual (any worker) makes an o¤er
to its most-preferred rm6 from amongst the set of rms who have not already
rejected the worker, while a rm rejects all those workers who are not in the rms
choice set from those proposals it has not yet rejected. The algorithm terminates
when no rm rejects a worker. Since rmspreferences are substitutable, a rm
never regrets the decision to reject a worker at any step.
Now, consider the following modication of this algorithm.
Stage 1: For all c 2 C, let P (c) denote the restriction of P (w) on the set
(F Wfcg) [ fwg. Consider market M1 where each c 2 C is treated as a single
individual with preference ordering P (c), so that the set of individuals is C[Q.
The set of rms remains F . Note that in M1, preferences of all agents satisfy
the assumptions of the traditional model, since conditions (ii) and (iv) in the
denition of togetherness holds and rms have group substitutable preferences.
Now, use the deferred-acceptance algorithm with workers proposing, and let
1 be the resulting matching. Let C
1 be the set of couples who are matched to
some rm in F . If C1 = C, then stop the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: For all (m;w) = c 2 C nC1, let P (m) and P (w) denote the restriction
of P (m) and P (w) on (F  fmg) [ fmg and (F  fwg) [ fwg respectively. Let
M2 denote the market where each c 2 C1 is treated as a single individual with
preference P (c), while P (m) and P (w) are the preferences of each pair (m;w) 2
C n C1. Each i 2 Q has the original preference ordering P (i). Again, now by
conditions (iii) and (iv) in the denition of togetherness and group substitutability,
M2 satises all the assumptions of the traditional model.
Let 2 denote the matching resulting from the deferred-acceptance algorithm
with workers proposing. Let C2 denote the set of couples in C1 who are matched
to rms according to 2. If C
1 = C2, then stop the algorithm.
In general, stop the algorithm in any stage K such that CK = CK 1, and call
K the outcome produced by the algorithm.
Let us call this the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algorithm.
Theorem 1: Let  be the outcome of the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algo-
rithm. If P 2 PcT then  is in the core of any market with couples.
Proof : Suppose  is not in the core of the (original) market with couples. Since
it is trivial to check that  is individually rational, let  be blocked by some
6Note that in the traditional model, individuals have a strict preference ordering over rms.
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pair (F; S) where S  W.
Let  = K , so that the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algorithm terminates
in stage K. Note that by construction CK = CK 1.
We rst show that S \  CK 1 [Q = ;. Obviously, since each c 2 CK 1 is
matched to some rm in K , no member of c would prefer a match with F to K
if her partner is not matched to F .
So, suppose (F; c)P (c)(K(c); c). Consider the deferred-acceptance algorithm
in stageK. At some stage, c must have made an o¤er to F , but was rejected. But,
since SP (F )K(F ) and the rms preference are group substitutable, c cannot be
contained in S.
For analogous reasons, S \Q = ;.
Since couples in C nCK split up in stage K and since K must be in the core
of market MK , the only remaining possibility is that S consists of some couples
in C n CK ; that is, there are some fc1; :::; clg who are not matched as couples in
K 1 (and hence K), but such that F prefers these couples to K(F ).
Now, not K 1(F )P (F )K(F ). For, suppose K 1(F )P (F )K(F ). Choose
j 2 K 1(F ) such that j =2 K(F ). Then, j made an o¤er to F in some step k
in MK 1 and was accepted. Given group substitutability, if j made an o¤er to F
in MK in step k, then j would be accepted by F . So, in MK , j is accepted by
some rm F 0 in an earlier step q. Moreover, F 0 rejected j in MK 1. Again, this
violates group substitutability of P (F 0).
Hence, not K 1(F )P (F )K(F ). Note that SP (F )K(F ) implies
SP (F )K 1(F ). Moreover, S consists of couples who were not matched in K 1.
Hence, (F; S) blocks K 1, which contradicts the fact that K 1 is in the core of
MK 1.
In the next result, we will assume that workers preferences are F-
lexicographic. We will see that in this case, the core is nonempty.
Let (P (w1); :::; P (wp)) be any prole of F-lexicographic workerspreferences.
Let Pi be the ordering over F induced by P (wi). Then, for all P 2 PF , let
Pt = (fP t(F )gF2F ; fP t(w)gw2W) be the prole such that P t(F ) = P (F ) for all
F 2 F , and P t(wi) = Pi for all wi 2 W. For any P 2 PF , we label Pt to be the
induced traditional prole.
We remind the reader that CW (Pt) 6= ;.7
Theorem 2: For all P 2 PF , CW (Pt)  C(P).
7See, for instance, Roth and Sotomayor [6, Proposition 5.36].
12
Proof : Consider any P 2 PF , let Pt be the induced traditional prole, and let
 2 CW (Pt).
Since  2 CW (Pt),  is individually rational. Suppose  =2 C(P). Then, 
is blocked by some pair (F; S), where F 2 F and S 2 2W . With some abuse
of notation, we denote (wi) = Fi for all wi 2 W. So, S P (F )(F ). Also,
(F; S)P (wi)(Fi; (Fi)) 8wi 2 S. The latter also implies that FiPiF for no wi 2 S.
Hence, (F; S) weakly blocks  according to Pt. This contradicts the hypothesis
that  2 CW (Pt).
We now analyse more radicaldepartures from the traditional model.
Theorem 3: There is P 2 PURD such that C(P) = ;.
Proof : Let F= fF1; F2g, and W= fw1; w2; w3; w4g.
We construct a preference prole P 2 PURD such that C(P) = ;. Remind-
ing the reader that workerspreferences are W-lexicographic, we only describe
workerspreferences over coworkers.
Let fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the unanimous ranking of workers according to desir-
ability; i.e., wi is ranked higher than wi+1. P is given by the following table, where
again, elements are ranked in descending order of preference and only acceptable
partners are listed.
F1 F2 w1 w2 w3 w4
fw2; w3; w4g fw1; w2g fw1; w2g fw1; w2; w3g fw1; w2; w3g fw1; w4g
fw2; w3g fw1; w4g fw1; w3g fw1; w2; w4g fw1; w3; w4g fw2; w4g
fw3; w4g fw1g fw1; w4g fw2; w3; w4g fw2; w3; w4g fw1; w3; w4g
fw2; w4g fw2g fw1g fw1; w2g fw1; w3g fw2; w3; w4g
fw1; w4g fw3g fw2; w3g fw2; w3g fw3; w4g
fw2g fw4g fw2; w4g fw3; w4g fw4g
fw4g fw2g fw3g
fw3g
fw1g
The reader can check that no worker can be unemployed in a matching  if
 2 C(P). Now, individual rationality implies that the only candidates for a
matching in C(P) are:
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F1 F2
1 fw3; w4g fw1; w2g
2 fw2; w3g fw1; w4g
3 fw2; w3; w4g fw1g
However, 1 is blocked by fF1g [ fw2; w3; w4g. Also, 2 is blocked by fF2g [
fw1; w2g and 3 is blocked by fF2g [ fw1; w4g.
Hence, C(P) = ;.
In our next theorem, we show that the core can be empty even if workers
preferences are separable.
Theorem 4: There is P 2 Ps such that C(P) = ;.
Proof : Let F = fF1; F2g, and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g. Again, we construct a
preference prole P 2 PS such that C(P) = ;.
First, the sets of workers judged to be good by each worker are shown below
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
Gi fw2; w3; w5g fw1; w3; w4; w5g fw1; w2; w4; w5g fw2; w3; w5g fw1; w2; w3g
The preference orderings, in descending order of preferences are:
Fi(i = 1; 2) w1 w2 w3 w5
fw2; w3; w4; w5g fw1; w2; w3g fw2; w4; w5g fw2; w3; w4; w5g fw1; w5g
fw2; w4; w5g fw1; w5g fw1; w2; w3g fw1; w2; w3g fw2; w3; w4; w5g
fw1; w2; w3g fw2; w3; w4g fw2; w3; w4g
fw1; w5g
Notice that we have not specied preferences of rms and workers completely.
Any extension is permissible, subject to the preference orderings being consistent
with the goodsets specied above and the prole being in PS.
Note that the matching h(Fi; fw1; w2; w3g);(Fj; fw4; w5)i is blocked by fFig [
fw2; w4; w5g. To check this, note that w2 is goodfor both w4 and w5. Moreover,
fw2; w4; w5g P2fw1; w2; w3g, while fw2; w4; w5gP (Fi)fw1; w2; w3g.
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Consider h(Fi; fw2; w4; w5g);(Fj; fw1; w3g)i. This is blocked by
fFig [ fw2; w3; w4; w5g since w3 is good for wi; i = 2; 4; 5, and
fw2; w3; w4; w5g P3fw1; w3g.
Also, h(Fi; fw2; w3; w4; w5g; (Fj; fw1g)i is blocked by fFjg [ fw1; w5g since
fw1; w5gP (Fj)fw1g; fw1; w5g P5fw2; w3; w4; w5g and w5 is goodfor wj.
Finally, it can be checked that h(Fi; fw1; w5g); (Fj; fw2; w3; w4g)i is blocked by
fFig [ fw1; w2; w3g. This is su¢ cient to show that C(P) = ;.
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